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L Introduction
Our religion tells us so. Our oral history tells us so. All of those

tell us that we were created here. We did not cross any land
bridge like the scientists tell us. Our religion tells us we were

created here. Period.'
Such was the view expressed by one Umatilla Indian religious leader
upon learning that the recently-unearthed "Kennewick Man" skeleton was
nearly 10,000 years old. Kennewick Man's great age, to Mr. Minthorn's
mind, merely confirmed what he already knew-the skeleton had to be that
of a tribal ancestor because his people had always lived along the Columbia
River near Kennewick, Washington, where the remains were found.2 In
view of similar certainty on the part of many tribes about their peoples'
historic origins, many Native Americans contend that no worthwhile
knowledge can be gleaned from studying ancient skeletons.3 Moreover, the
study of such skeletons violates the religious beliefs of many tribes which
require that disinterred human remains be reburied immediately. 4

*
Candidate for J.D., Washington & Lee University School of Law, May, 2009;
B.A. University of Maine, 2004. I would like to thank Professor Tim Jost and my father, Dr.
David Van Horn, for their thoughtful criticism and careful editing.
1. JEFF BENEDICT, No BONE UNTURNED: THE ADVENTURES OF A TOP SMITHSONIAN
FORENSIC SCIENTIST AND THE LEGAL BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S OLDEST SKELETONS 106 (2003)
(quoting Armand Minthorn).
2. See Douglas W. Owsley & Richard L. Jantz, Kennewick Man-A Kin Too
Distant?, in CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES:

CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE

NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 143 (Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds.,
2002) ("If this individual is over 9,000 years old, that only substantiates our belief that he is
Native American. From our oral histories, we know that our people have been part of this
land since the beginning of time.") (quoting Armand Minthorn, Ancient Human Remains
Need to Be Reburied, TRI-CrrY HERALD, Nov. 30, 1997, at Dl).
3. See id. at 143-44 ("We never asked science to make a determination as to our
origins. We know where we came from. We are the descendants of the Buffalo People.
They came from inside the earth after supernatural spirits prepared the world for humankind
to live here. If non-Indians choose to believe they evolved from an ape, so be it.") (quoting
Sebastian Le Beau, Repatriation Officer for the Cheyenne River Sioux, in George Johnson,
Indian Tribes' CreationistsThwart Archeologists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A1).
4. See id. at 143 (noting that the Umatillas' religious and cultural beliefs mandate
burial of the skeleton as soon as possible); see also Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk,
The Native American Graves Protectionand RepatriationAct: Background and Legislative
History, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35 (1992), reprinted in REPATRIATION READER: WHO OWNS
AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS? 132 (Devon A. Mihesuah ed., 2000) (asserting that Indian
tribes "commonly believed that if the dead are disturbed or robbed, the spirit is disturbed and
wanders-a spiritual trauma for the deceased that can also bring ill upon the living").
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For scientists, however, Kennewick Man's extreme antiquity intimated
an exciting and unprecedented glimpse into North America's prehistoric
past.5 In opposing the reburial of Kennewick Man, scientists emphasized
the skull's cranial features, which are dissimilar to those of any known
Native American population. 6 The scientists also maintain that Indian
tribes' declarations of relationship and continuity with remains become
debatable and arguably unrealistic with remains, like Kennewick Man,
which are thousands of years old. To assume that Kennewick Man is the
direct ancestor of a tribe inhabiting the region today assumes no migration
in or out of the area for more than nine thousand years. 7
Thus, the debate over Kennewick Man reveals the basic disconnect
between the beliefs and interests of Native American tribes and the
scientific community. On one hand, scientific study of Kennewick Man is
likely to yield information tending to undermine the Umatilla oral history
while also violating the tribe's religious beliefs concerning appropriate
treatment of the dead. Yet, respecting the tribe's oral histories and religious
beliefs means countenancing the loss of incredibly valuable, if not entirely
unique, archaeological data. This fundamental tension gives rise to difficult
questions such as whose vision of "truth" and what quantum of "evidence"
should guide the disposition of ancient human remains like those of
Kennewick Man.
This Note considers Congress's reconciliation of these competing
beliefs and interests under the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of 1990.8 In particular, it examines the ways
in which a new regulation proposed by the Department of the Interior (DOI)
threatens to knock off kilter the precarious balance struck by NAGPRA. 9
The statute's equilibrium is embodied in the central tenet of NAGPRA that
human remains should be repatriated to Native American tribes that can
demonstrate cultural affiliation with them.'
The new DOI regulation,
5. See Owsley & Jantz, supra note 2, at 146 (contending that scientific study is
required to determine whether Kennewick Man is actually similar to any living group, and to
test new theories against traditional assumptions about the peopling of the Americas).
6. See id. at 141-42 (citing a preliminary examination of Kennewick Man by several
physical anthropologists which concluded that the skeleton's cranial features could not be
linked biologically to any existing tribal group).
7. Id. at 144.

8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (1990).
9. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act RegulationsDisposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 72 Fed. Reg. 58,582 (proposed
Oct. 16, 2007) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10.11) [hereinafter Disposition of CUHR].
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1) (2000) ("If... the cultural affiliation of Native
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however, requires museums and agencies to cede control over even those
remains that are culturally unidentifiable, a mandate that could sound the
death knell for the study of all prehistoric North American human
remains."
The Note begins with an account of the inability of traditional
common law and statutory grave protections to afford Native American
burials equal protection. This account is followed by a discussion of
NAGPRA as a response to these problems. The Note next analyzes major
legal challenges to the disposition of human remains under NAGPRA to
date, focusing in particular on the litigation over the Kennewick and Spirit
Cave Men. Finally, the Note considers whether the Secretary of the Interior
has authority to regulate culturally unidentifiable remains under NAGPRA
and whether the proposed rule is consonant with the statute's spirit.
II. Grave Protectionsat Common Law and Under State Statute
A. Grave Protectionsat Early American Common Law
When the American common law was developing during the 18th and
19th centuries, "courts and legislatures had little opportunity to consider
issues involving the disposition of prehistoric aboriginal remains and grave
goods." 12 Interestingly, this was due in part to a belief prevalent among
professionals at the time that Native Americans had only recently arrived in
the Americas and were too nomadic and simple to have built the continent's
many burial, effigy, and temple mounds.' 3 While such beliefs were
convenient for politicians seeking to justify the confiscation of Indian lands,
they also "delayed the adoption in the United States of European technical

American human remains and associated funerary objects with a particular Indian tribe ... is
established, then the Federal agency or museum... shall expeditiously return such remains
and associated funeral objects.").
11. See Disposition of CUHR, supra note 9, at 58,585 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt.
10.11(c)) ("A museum or Federal agency that is unable to prove that it has right of
possession.., to culturally unidentifiable human remains must offer to transfer control of
the human remains to Indian tribes.").
12. H. MARCUS PRICE III, DIsPuTING THE DEAD: U.S. LAW ON ABORIGINAL REMAINS
AND GRAVE GOODS 21 (1991).
13. See id. at 22 (observing that complex Native American burial structures "were
variously attributed to survivors of Mu or Atlantis, or to wandering Scandinavians or the lost
tribes of Israel").
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innovations," i.e., excavation, for archaeological "sites with significant
'time depth.'"14

Thus, while significant looting of Native American graves occurred in
the 19th century, these activities were generally undertaken pursuant to
deplorable Government policies and did not involve archaeological effort.' 5
Not surprisingly, such policies went unchallenged in court by Native
Americans. 16 After all, "[e]arly American courts, like politicians and
archaeologists of the time, were likely to be racially biased and Indians had
little reason to have confidence in them." 7 As a result of these convening
factors, the courts and lawmakers were not allowed the benefit of
considering practical issues related to appropriate disposition of prehistoric
aboriginal remains and grave goods or regarding the property rights of
Indians to these items. Thus, when issues later surfaced in the courts, the
judicial system was forced to apply an established body of statutes and
common law to situations that law had not previously considered and with
which it was ill suited to deal.' 8
In England, dead bodies were traditionally buried in churchyards for
protection.' 9 The church parson alone had standing to seek "a remedy
against disturbers of the dead" and had to do so in English ecclesiastical
court because the common law did not recognize the relatives of a deceased
as having property rights in the corpse.2 ° In the United States, churchyard
burials were not as prevalent as in England, and ecclesiastical courts were
unknown. E' While early American common law similarly recognized no
"ownership" rights in corpses, the remedy of the parson in England was
14.

Id.

15. See id. (discussing an 1868 Surgeon General's order to his field officers to secure
as many Indian skeletons as they were able); see also Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at
126 (noting that the Surgeon General's order resulted in more than four thousand Native
American heads being taken from battlefields, burial grounds, POW camps, hospitals, fresh
graves and burial scaffolds across the country over several decades).
16. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at 130 ("Disputes between Native people and
American citizens were usually settled on the battlefield, instead of in courtrooms.").
17. PRICE Il, supra note 12, at 22.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 21 ("[B]odies of decedents whose relatives and friends were too poor to
bury them securely were freely dug up and sold by the thousands.").
20. See Steve Russell, Sacred Ground: Unmarked Graves Protectionin Texas Law, 4
TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 3, 10 (1998) ("Blackstone's 'parson' had the power and the duty to
keep the sanctity of the place where most people were buried--the churchyard-and the
ecclesiastical courts would provide a remedy against disturbers of the dead.").
21. See id. (noting that the common law in the United States placed responsibilities for
the dead upon the next of kin rather than with church parsons).
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quickly replaced by a "quasi-property property" right giving the deceased's
next of kin legal standing to possess the body for the purpose of burial and
to sue in tort for desecration of the deceased's grave.22 Statutes
criminalizing the desecration of formally dedicated burials and cemeteries
were also enacted in many jurisdictions.23
B. Common Law Standing.
Judicial and legislative measures, however, were inadequate to furnish
Native American graves the same protection afforded other burials. For
instance, extension of the quasi property right which developed under the
American common law, even in the most liberal jurisdictions, was limited
to friends or relatives of the deceased.24 Thus, the common law failed to
account for the fact that Native American mortuary practices rarely, if ever,
involved marking the deceased's grave with his identity, or that many tribes
were forced to relocate far from their traditional burial grounds.25 As a
result, "[i]t is often difficult for living Indians to prove direct familial
descent from prehistoric aboriginal remains sufficient to constitute
26 the
remains."
the
protect
to
law
at
action
an
maintain
to
required
standing
Some commentators thought that the Louisiana case of Charrier v.
Bell2 7 signaled a new era of relaxed standing requirements for Native

22. See id. at 11 (explaining that interference with others' quasi-property rights in
dead bodies "constitute actionable wrongs"). Russell further observes that:
The bundle of rights includes that of holding and protecting the body until it is
processed for burial, cremation or other lawful disposition; selecting the place
and manner of disposition, and carrying out the burial or other last rites; and the
right to undisturbed repose of the remains in grave, crypt, niche, urn or
elsewhere sanctioned by law. Unlawful violations of these rights constitute
actionable wrongs.
Id.
23. See PRICE III, supra note 12, at 21 (observing that American courts replaced the
English church parson by substituting new principles of standing and by criminalizing the
desecration of formal cemeteries and burials).
24. See id. at 23 (noting that "[a] moderate view allows action by the next of kin, and
the strictest position allows only the direct heirs to bring an action").
25. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at 130 (explaining that the law does not
protect unmarked Native graves like it protects marked European graves).
26. PRICE IM, supra note 12, at 23; see also Russell, supra note 20, at 12 ("[Tjhe age
of some Native American remains and Native American burial practices make determining
the 'next of kin' in the European sense problematic.").
27. 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
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28

Americans.
There, an "amateur archaeologist" sought declaratory
judgment that he was the lawful owner of a collection of funerary objects
that he removed without permission from more than one hundred and fifty
Indian graves located on private property. 29 The Court ultimately awarded
the funerary collection to the local Indian tribe, but by that time the State
had purchased the property from its owners and subordinated its own claim
to the collection to that of the tribe. 30 Thus, although certain language in
Charrierappeared to broaden the legal concept of standing to accommodate
Native American tribal descendants, 3 1 it is far from certain that the tribe
would have prevailed if the State had not disclaimed its interest as
landowner in the grave goods.32
A more recent Tennessee case evidences persisting judicial reticence
to confer legal standing upon Native Americans seeking to protect
unmarked Native American graves on the basis of shared ethnicity with the
deceased.33 In Medicine Bird, the State brought a proceeding to discontinue
the use of some property as a Native American burial ground in order to
widen a highway intersection near Nashville. 34 Fifteen Native Americans
sought to intervene under a statute requiring that all "interested persons" be
given notice of an action to close a burial ground.35
28. See PRICE 11, supra note 12, at 23 (positing that Charrier "is often cited as
representing a new trend allowing greater freedom of standing for aborigines to claim buried
grave goods"); see also Zhara S. Karinshak, Comment, Relics of the Past: To Whom Do
They Belong? The Effect of an Archaeological Excavation on Property Rights, 46 EMORY
L.J. 867, 874-76 (1997) (asserting that the Charriercourt awarded the tribe possession of
the funerary collection on the basis of the Indians' relation to the individuals buried in the
graves).
29. Charrier,496 So. 2d at 603-04.
30. See id. at 605 (rejecting in turn the plaintiff's contentions that the tribe had
abandoned the funerary objects by burying them with the deceased and that giving the tribe
possession of the collection would amount to unjust enrichment).
31. See id. at 607 (dismissing the plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment on the ground
that "descendants have a right to enjoin the disinterment of their deceased relatives, as well
as to receive damages from the desecration involved. Such a right would be subverted if the
descendants were obliged to reimburse for the costs of excavation").
32. PRICE III, supra note 12, at 23. ("Confused reasoning by the [Charrier] court
mingles principles of title to the goods and to the underlying land.").
33. See Comm'r. of Transp. v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d
734, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Native American intervenors were not
"interested persons" within the meaning of a state statute requiring that such persons be
joined as defendants in a proceeding to close a burial ground).
34. Id. at 742.
35. See id. at 753 (paraphrasing TENN. ANN. CODE § 46-4-102). The statute defines
"interested persons" as follows:
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The appellate Court overturned the trial court's conclusion that the
Indians were interested persons, noting that "[t]he provisions for notice in
the statutory procedures for closing a burial ground reflect the common
law. 3 6 At common law, only "family members of deceased persons were
entitled to notice of proceedings to terminate the use of' property as a burial
ground.37 Finding that the Native American intervenors did not even
attempt "to prove that they [were] related by blood to any of the persons
buried in [the] graves,"
the Court denied them standing to intervene as
38
interested persons.
C. Cemetery Protectionsat Common Law and Under State Statute.
Like legal standing on the basis of shared ethnicity, common law
cemetery protections also proved to be ineffective tools for Native
Americans seeking to curtail the disturbance of Indian graves. In Wana the
Bear v. Community Construction, Inc.,3 for example, California's Miwok
tribe sought to enjoin the construction of a housing development which, at
the time of suit, had resulted in "the disinterring of over 200 [Native
American] human beings. '4° The issue before the Court was whether the
burial ground, known to have been used by the tribe before they were
driven from the area by 1870, had "achieved a protectable status as a
'public cemetery' under [an] 1872 cemetery law by virtue of its prior status
41
as a 'graveyard.'
An 1854 California statute "made punishable the mutilation of any
public grave yard," which it defined as any place "[w]here the bodies of six
or more persons are buried. 4 2 The 1854 law was superseded in 1872 by a
any and all persons who have any right or easement or other right in, or incident
or appurtenant to, a burial ground as such, including the surviving spouse and
children, or if no surviving spouse or children, the nearest relative or relatives by
consanguinity of any one or more deceased persons whose remains are buried in
any burial ground.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 757.
38. Id.
39. 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that an Indian burial ground
was not a "cemetery" within the meaning of an 1872 statute protecting cemeteries from
desecration because no interments were being made at the time of the statute's enactment).
40. Id. at 424.
41. Id. at 424-25.
42. Id. at 426.
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statute providing that a "public cemetery" could be established only through
official dedication or proscriptive use.43 Conceding that the burial ground
did not qualify as a protected cemetery under the dedication or proscription
provisions, the Wana plaintiff nevertheless contended that the 1872 statutes
applied to burials created prior to 1873 "by virtue of its derivation from the
1854 cemetery law." 44 The 1872 act, however, expressly provided that
"[n]o part of [it was] to be retroactive unless expressly so declared. 45
Because the Miwoks no longer made interments in the burial ground when
the new statute took effect, the Court ruled that "the burial ground was not
made a cemetery by operation of the" 1872 law. 46
The 1872 statute's lack of retroactivity, as well as the failure of
cemetery statutes to protect Native American burials generally, can be
explained by several factors. First, there is a legal presumption that "[iln
any clash between the interests of the dead... and the interests of the
living, presently extant persons prevail., 47 This common law principle
undergirds statutes like that in Medicine Bird, which authorize the closure
of burial grounds pursuant to the state's exercise of eminent domain.4 8
A second factor is that cemetery laws appear to have been aimed, at
least in part, at promoting public health and safety by ensuring the
interment of the recently-deceased. This explains why statutes regulating
the establishment of cemeteries and the burial of the dead are often codified
49
in public health and safety codes, like the one at issue in Wana the Bear.
In the case of largely-decomposed human remains decades or centuries old
(let alone millennia), however, public health and safety are simply not
implicated.

43. See id. (citing CAL. POL. CODE §§ 3105-3107 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 8100 et seq. (1939)). Section 3105 created a public cemetery on lands situated in
or near any city and used by the inhabitants "continuously and without interruption, as a
burial ground for five years." Id. Section 3106 was similar to the 1854 statute in that it
provided that "[s]ix or more bodies buried at one place constitutes the place a cemetery." Id.
Finally, § 3107 set out a procedure for dedicating public lands for cemetery purposes. Id.
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id. at 426.
46. Id. at 426-27.
47. Russell, supranote 20, at 11.
48. See Medicine Bird, 63 S.W. 3d at 749 (noting that "[w]hen the needs and
convenience of the living required it, abandoned cemeteries could be closed and the human
remains therein reinterred elsewhere").
49. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 8100 et seq., supra note 43; TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 711.001 et seq.
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These factors surely informed the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in
Carterv. City of Zanesville,5 0 a relevant case not directly involving Native
Americans graves. 5' There, the trustees of a public cemetery relocated the
remains of the plaintiffs mother from the grave in which she had been
buried for forty years.52 The plaintiff sought damages under a statute
creating a cause of action for the relatives of a deceased person against
anyone who takes "unlawful possession of the body. 5 3 Yet, the Court ruled
that the statutory terms "bodies" and "corpses" did not include "the remains
of persons long buried and decomposed. 5 4 Thus, Carter stands for the
Anglo-centric proposition that as dead bodies decompose, they become less
entitled to "that secure repose which natural55 affection and a decent respect
for the remains of a human being demand."
In view of these cases, it is clear that the common law simply cannot
furnish unmarked Indian graves a level of protection that comports with
modem sensibilities. Because contemporary Native Americans can rarely
prove specific blood relationships to Indians buried in unmarked graves,
they will normally lack the legal standing required to assert quasi property
rights in the remains that would give them control over their disposition.56
This problem, highlighted in cases like Medicine Bird and Charrier, is
exacerbated by the fact that so many tribes have been forcibly relocated
over the years.57 Decisions like Wana the Bear evidence similar inefficacy
on the part of common law cemetery protections to afford Indian burial
grounds the same solicitude enjoyed by white graveyards.58 Lastly, cases
like Carterand Glass suggest that common law protections of bodies may
not attach at all in the case of remains that are largely decomposed, as will
usually be the case in older Indian graves.59
50. 52 N.E. 126 (Ohio 1898); see also State v. Glass, 273 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ohio
1971) (affirming Carter).
51. See Carter, 52 N.E. at 127 (ruling that a statute creating a civil cause of action
against one who unlawfully takes possession of the body of a deceased person does not
apply where the human remains were buried long ago and are largely decomposed).
52. See id. at 126 (setting out that the plaintiffs mother's remains were "taken up
and... commingled with many other remains, so as to make identification
impossible... and carted off to some unknown spot in said cemetery").
53. Id. at 127 (quoting repealed OHIO REv. STAT. § 3764).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See supra Part H.B.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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IlL NAGPRA
A. Overview
In response to these common law shortcomings, states began adopting
laws in the 1980's "prohibit[ing] intentional grave disturbance, provid[ing]
guidelines to protect unmarked graves, and mandat[ing] disposition of
human remains from the graves in a way that guarantees reburial after a
period of study." 6 At least five states passed legislation specifically
requiring that Native American human remains found on state lands or in
the possession of state agencies or museums be repatriated to appropriate
tribes for reburial.6 '
NAGPRA, enacted in 1990, comprises the Government's solution to
these problems. Lauded as "human rights legislation," NAGPRA was
"designed to address the flagrant violation of the 'civil rights of America's
first citizens"' in three primary ways.62 The statute first establishes
guidelines for disposing of the massive quantity of Native American human
remains held by the Government at the time of the statute's enactment.63
Hence, NAGPRA directs federal agencies and museums receiving federal
funds to inventory their collections of Native American human remains and
cultural objects. 64 The inventories must be made available to all federallyrecognized tribes, who may request the repatriation of enumerated items. 65
Second, NAGPRA provides for the disposition of Native American
human remains that might be found on federal and tribal lands subsequent
to its enactment-an important provision in view of the Government's vast
landholdings in the arid American west where well-preserved human
remains and objects are especially likely to be recovered. 66 This section
60. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at 135.
61. See id. ("The five states are California, Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska and Arizona.").
62. Id. at 136.
63. See id. (stating that "[i]n 1986, a number of Northern Cheyenne leaders discovered
that almost 18,500 [Native American] human remains were warehoused in the Smithsonian
Institution").
64. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3005-3006 (1990) (providing for the repatriation of Native American
human remains and objects possessed by federal agencies and museums).
65. See id. § 3003 (setting mandatory inventory requirements applicable to federal
agencies and museums).
66. See REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE, FEDERAL LAND AND BUILDING OWNERSHIP 1,
available at http://johnshadegg.house.gov/rsc/FedLandsOwnership603.pdf (revealing that
the federal government owns more than 670 million acres, or 29.7% of the land in the United
States, more than 90% of which is located in the American West).
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provides that tribes shall retain "ownership or control" of such Native
American human remains and cultural objects. 67 NAGPRA's third
provision, with which this Note is least concerned, criminalizes trafficking
in Native American human remains or cultural objects without a valid right
68
of possession to them.
B. Statutory Limitations on Repatriation.
Although it grants broad remedial rights to Native Americans,
NAGPRA also "reflect[s] a compromise forged by representatives of the
museum, scientific and Indian communities. NAGPRA was designed to
create a process that would reflect both the needs of museums as
repositories of the nation's cultural heritage and the rights of Indian
people." 69 To that end, NAGPRA imposes some important limitations on
tribes' abilities to demand repatriation. First, human remains or cultural
objects must be "Native American" within NAGPRA's meaning in order to
be subject to the provisions of the Act. 70 Second, the statute requires tribes
claiming human remains or objects to establish cultural affiliation by a
preponderance of the evidence with the items to be repatriated. 7'
A third restriction allows museums to decline to repatriate cultural
objects to which they can show a "right of possession. 7 2 This provision
reflected the drafters' concern that requiring museums to repatriate objects
in which they have a legitimate property interest would work an
unconstitutional taking. 73 The statute, however, contains no similar
provision authorizing museums to retain human remains where a right of
possession can be shown. Perhaps NAGPRA's drafters simply assumed
67.
68.

25 U.S.C. § 3002.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (1990).

69. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at 140.
70. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (explaining that "'Native American' means of, or relating
to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States").

71. Id. § 3005(a)(4).
72. Id. § 3005(13).
73. See id. (reflecting the concern of the drafters).
The acquisition of a Native American [cultural
with... the voluntary consent of an individual
alienate such object is deemed to give the right

Section 3005(13) reads:
object] from an Indian tribe
or group with authority to
of possession of that object,

unless the phrase so defined would ... result in a Fifth Amendment taking by the
United States (emphasis added).
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that because the quasi-property right to possess human remains at common
law was limited to the next of kin for the narrow purpose of reburial,
museums74 could not acquire a constitutionally-cognizable property interest
in them.
This theory, though, is unsatisfactory because NAGPRA expressly
defines a right of possession to Native American human remains and
therefore seems to anticipate that non-Native Americans may acquire such a
right, presumably for purposes other than reburial.75 Thus, although
NAGPRA illegalizes trafficking in Native American human remains
without a right of possession, the statute appears to allow the alienation of
such remains for profit if one can show such a right.76 "Such discretion
sounds much like the attributes of a property interest, the deprivation of
which would give rise to at least a due process claim, if not a takings
claim.' 7 7 Moreover, cases like Carter and Glass suggest that decomposed
"skeletons and body parts do not fall under the common law doctrine
78
foreclosing property rights in a dead body.
To date, no museum has mounted a challenge to a request for the
repatriation of human remains on the ground that it has a right of possession
to, or ownership interest in, such remains. Indeed, it would be a rare
museum that obtained Native American human remains in compliance with
section 3001(13), which requires "full knowledge and consent of the next of
kin or the official governing body of the appropriate culturally affiliated
Indian tribe. 7 9 What is more, it would be unwise for a museum to assert
such an argument, at least in the case of a very old skeleton. In addition to
having to prove knowledge and consent, a museum claiming a right of
possession may also have to demonstrate the remains' cultural affiliation
74. See Daniel J. Hurtado, Native American Graves Protection and RepatriationAct:
Does it Subject Museums to a Fifth Amendment Taking?, 6 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 1, 18 (1993)
(asserting that because human remains are quasi-property rightfully possessed by the
descendants for the limited purpose of burial, it may be legally impossible for a museum to
acquire a property interest in them).
75. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) ("The original acquisition of Native American human
remains... obtained with full knowledge and consent of the next of kin or the official
governing body of the appropriate culturally affiliated Indian tribe ... is deemed to give
right of possession to those remains.").
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1170(a) ("Whoever knowingly sells purchases, uses for profit, or
transports for sale or profit, the human remains of a Native American without the right of
possession to those remains as provided in [NAGPRA, is guilty of a misdemeanor].").
77. Hurtado, supra note 74, at 19.
78. Id. at 20.
79. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13).
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with the tribe that purportedly gave the right of possession. In the case of
ancient skeletons, it is easier, and often far more plausible, to rely on
NAGPRA's first two limitations by asserting that the remains are not
culturally-affiliated with the claimant tribe, or that the remains are not
Native American at all. The scope of these limits on repatriation has been
tested in the federal courts in recent years, and the focus of this Note now
shifts to that litigation.

C. What is "NativeAmerican"? The Problem of Kennewick Man.
In the landmark Bonnichsen v. United States80 decision, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that
NAGPRA does not govern the disposition of the nearly ten-thousand year
old Kennewick Man. 8 ' Kennewick Man's remains, the most complete
skeleton of such antiquity ever found in the United States, were discovered
on federal land under the control of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
in 1996.82 Dr. Douglas Owsley, the head of the Physical Anthropology
Department at the Smithsonian Institution and a plaintiff in the case, "made
arrangements... to bring this important find to [Washington, D.C.,] for
further study., 8 3 Tribal claimants, including the Umatilla, intervened and
demanded "that the remains be turned over to them for immediate

80. 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004). In Bonnichsen, a group of scientists sought judicial
review of the DOI's decision that the nearly 10,000 year old remains of Kennewick Man
were culturally affiliated with a coalition of Indian tribes. Id. at 868-69. The issue before
the Court of Appeals was whether Kennewick Man's remains were "Native American" and
therefore subject to NAGPRA. Id. at 875. To be "Native American" under the statute,
remains must be "of, or relating to, a tribe or culture that is indigenous to the United States."
Id. Thus, the Court reasoned, Kennewick Man is subject to NAGPRA only if the remains
can be shown to bear some genetic or cultural relationship to a presently existing tribe,
people or culture. Id. Noting the great physical dissimilarity between the Kennewick Man
and the tribal claimants, as well as the utter lack of evidence of cultural similarities, the
Court ruled that the DOI's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 88081. Because NAGPRA did not apply, the scientists would be permitted to study the remains
under the Archaeological Resource Protection Act. Id. at 882.
81. See id. at 882 ("We thus hold that Kennewick Man's remains are not Native
American human remains within the meaning of NAGPRA and that NAGPRA does not
apply to them.").
82. See id. at 869 (noting that less than twelve crania older than 8,000 years have been
found in the U.S., whereas Kennewick Man's skeleton was 90% intact).
83. Id. at 870.
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reburial. 84 Citing NAGPRA, the Corps sided with the Indians, though the
district court later vacated that decision.85
Soon thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior assumed responsibility for
determining whether the remains were "Native American" and therefore
whether their disposition would be governed by NAGRA: "Relying solely
on the age of the remains and the fact that the remains were found within
the United States, ... the Secretary pronounced Kennewick Man's remains
'Native American' within NAGPRA's meaning." 86 The Secretary also
found that Kennewick Man was "culturally affiliated with present-day
Indian tribes" and so awarded possession to the tribal claimants. 87 The
scientist-plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and again the district court
held in their favor, ruling that the evidence did not support the Secretary's
decision and that NAGPRA did not apply.88
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit set out that the first step in determining
whether NAGPRA governs the disposition of human remains is to ascertain
whether they are "Native American. '89 NAGPRA defines "Native
American" as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture that is indigenous
to the United States." 90 The Court found the words "that is" to be of
paramount importance because they unambiguously require "that human
remains bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe people, or
culture to be considered Native American." 9' Furthermore, the Court held
that the primary purpose of NAGPRA, to "spar[e] [modern Native
Americans] the indignity and resentment that would be aroused by the
the
despoiling of their ancestors' graves," is simply not served by requiring
92
repatriation "of human remains that bear no relationship to them."
The Court thus rejected the Secretary's regulation implementing
section 3001(9)'s definition of "Native American," which omitted the

84. Id.
85. See id. at 871 (referring to Bonnichsen v. United States., 969 F.Supp. 628, 645 (D.
Or. 1997) "Bonnichsen IX').
86. Id. at 872.
87. Id.
88. See id. (describing the procedural history and outcome in Bonnichsen v. United
States, 217 F.Supp.2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002) "Bonnichsen 11P).
89. See id. at 875 (noting that "[t]he first inquiry is whether human remains are Native
American within the statute's meaning").
90. Id. at 875 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9)).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 876.
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talismanic statutory words "that is. ' ' 93 The Court held that the regulation
subverted Congress's unambiguous requirement that remains bear some
significant relationship to an existing tribe and so was not entitled to
Chevron deference.94
The Court concluded that the Secretary's construction of NAGPRA,
under which any remains that predate European settlers are deemed to be
Native
American,
"has no principle
of limitation beyond
geography... [and] does not appear.., to be what Congress had in
95
mind.
Lastly, the Court determined that the Secretary's decision was
arbitrary and capricious because the administrative record contained no
evidence "that Kennewick Man's remains are connected by some special or
significant genetic or cultural relationship" to an existing tribe. 96 With
respect to a possible genetic relationship, the Court noted that the "features
of Kennewick Man most closely resemble those of Polynesians and
southern Asians" and "differ significantly from those of any modem Indian
group. 0 7 It further held that the only evidence of a cultural relationship
came from oral histories. 98 The Court ruled that the 9,000 year gap between
the time of the Kennewick Man and the present was simply too great to be
99
bridged by oral traditions alone.
In 1998, the Army Corps used helicopters to bury the location of
Kennewick Man's discovery under two million pounds of rubble,
93. See id. at 877 (stating that "[t]he Secretary by regulation has defined 'Native
American' to mean 'of, or relating to a tribe, people or culture indigenous to the United
States"' (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d))).
94. See id. ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." (explaining Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984))).
95. Id. at 876.
96. Id. at 880.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 881 ("One of the Secretary's experts ... concluded that modem day
Plateau tribes' oral histories-some of which can be interpreted to refer to ancient floods,
volcanic eruptions, and the like-are 'highly suggestive of long-term establishment of the
present-day tribes."').
99. See id. at 881 (discussing the inherent unreliability of such ancient oral histories).
Specifically, the Court relied upon evidence in the record suggesting that oral histories
change relatively quickly; that they may be based upon later observation of geological
features rather than on eyewitnesses' accounts of ancient events; and that the oral histories
introduced at trial may have come from a culture or group other than the one to which
Kennewick Man belonged. Id.
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"effectively end[ing] efforts to determine whether there [were] other
artifacts present at the site which might shed light on the relationship
between the remains and contemporary Indians."'1'
The district court
became convinced that the Corps' underlying goal had been to prevent
future investigation by burying the site and not, as it purported, to preserve
archaeological integrity or to combat erosion.' 0 ' It further rebuked the
Corps' one-sided policy of consulting with the tribes while keeping the
scientist-plaintiffs in the dark until after the final decision to bury the site
had been made. 0 2 The Corps' decision to bury the site also came in the
face of a bill which had passed both houses of Congress and
that would
03
have prohibited such action without the approval of the court.
It is paradoxical that in its fervor to foreclose study of the site, the
Corps demolished a potential source of evidence that could have proved
that Kennewick Man was Native American. The Corps' actions belie its
gross overestimation of the willingness of the courts to look past the clear
limits which NAGPRA imposes upon Native Americans groups' power to
demand repatriation. Instead, the opinions of the district court and the
Ninth Circuit struck a blow in affirmation of the vitality of those limits and,
in so doing, appeared to effectuate Congress's actual intent in enacting
NAGPRA-repatriating to presently-extant tribes the remains of their
ancestors.
D. What does it mean to be "CulturallyAffiliated"? The Problem of Spirit
Cave Man
The requirement that a tribe establish cultural affiliation with
human remains in order to obtain their repatriation was explored by the
district court in Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. United States Bureau
of Land Management,' 4 litigation over the remains of the Spirit Cave
100. Id. atn.10
101. See Bonnichsen IH, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25 ("[T]he lengthy administrative
record.. . strongly suggests that the Corps' primary objective in covering the site was to
prevent additional remains or artifacts from being discovered, not to preserve the site's
archaeological value or to remedy a severe erosion control problem as [the Corps] has
represented to this court.").
102. See id. at 1125 ("The Tribal Claimants demanded, and the Corps eventually
agreed, that the site be 'armored' to provide 'permanent protection' against disturbances.").
103. See id. (noting that the bill was awaiting the conference committee to resolve
unrelated provisions when the Corps buried the site).
104. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d
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Man. 10 5 The Spirit Cave Man's partially-mummified remains had been
held by the Nevada State Museum since the time of their discovery in
1940.106 The remains were long believed to be less than 2,000 years old,
though the Museum radiocarbon dated Spirit Cave Man after NAGPRA's
enactment "[a]s part of the inventory and identification process required"
pursuant to section 3003.107 The analysis showed that "the initial estimate
for the age of the bones ... was significantly flawed. The remains were, in
fact, nearly 10,000 years old and, accordingly, a significant scientific
, 108

find."

Spirit Cave Man was discovered on the aboriginal lands of the tribal
plaintiffs, though the defendant Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has
controlled the land since before the "time of [the remains']
discovery... [up] until the present day."' 1 9 In 1996, the Museum
determined that the Spirit Cave Man was culturally-unaffiliated and "the
BLM authorized further study of the remains." 110 The BLM authorized
such study despite the facts that it had not made a final determination as to
the Spirit Cave Man's culturally-affiliated status and that the tribe had not
had an opportunity to respond to the Museum's determination. 1 ' In 1999,
the Tribe was finally able to submit scientific evidence to the BLM, and, in
2000, the agency issued its final decision that the remains were culturally
unaffiliated. 112 The Tribe then turned to the NAGPRA Review Committee
1207 (D. Nev. 2006). In this case, the Native American Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe
requested that the United States Bureau of Land Management return the mummified body of
a man now known as the Spirit Cave Man to the Tribe for reburial. Id. at 1209. The remains
were inventoried and analyzed by the Nevada State Museum pursuant to the requirements of
the NAGPRA. Id at 1210. The court found that the Bureau of Land Management's
decision not to repatriate the Spirit Cave Man's remains was arbitrary and capricious
because the agency failed to "fairly and adequately consider the evidence provided by the
Tribe," and gave "no cogent explanation why [the agency] chose to deny the repatriation
request." Id. at 1223.
105. See id. at 1223 (finding that the Bureau of Land Management's determination that
the Spirit Cave Man's remains were not affiliated with any Native American tribe was
arbitrary and capricious).
106. See id. at 1209 (describing the discovery, excavation, and placement of the Spirit
Cave Man's remains in the Nevada State Museum).
107. Id. at 1210.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1210-11 (explaining that the BLM had "implied that notification of the
[Museum's] determination would be followed by a brief period for responses before a final
determination [by BLM] was made").
112. See id. at 1211 ("Finally, in August 2000, BLM released a 111 page report
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and requested it "consider the matter and make findings concerning the
affiliation of the remains and their potential repatriation to the tribe.""' 3
NAGPRA had established the Review Committee to "monitor and
review the implementation of the inventory and identification process and
repatriation activities required" by the Act. 1 4 The composition of the
Committee was intended to reflect the compromise between the interests of
the Native American and scientific and museum communities. 15 Its
responsibilities include "facilitating the resolution of any disputes among
Indian tribes ... and Federal agencies or museums relating to"
repatriation. 16 Although the Committee's findings are not binding, they are
admissible evidence in court1 17 On the basis of evidence submitted by the
tribe, the Committee determined that "the Spirit Cave Man remains were in
fact culturally affiliated with the Tribe and that the remains should be
repatriated to the Tribe."" 8
The BLM, however, took the position that the Review Committee was
only an advisory board, and declined to formally address, or reconsider its
position in light of, the Committee's findings.11 9 The tribe sued the BLM,
alleging that the agency's determination of non-affiliation was both
procedurally and substantively deficient. 20
Before addressing these
allegations, the Court dismissed an argument raised by an amicus brief
contending that "remains as old as Spirit Cave Man's are not likely to be
classified as 'Native American"' under the Ninth Circuit's Bonnichsen
decision.1 21 The Court ruled that "[b]oth the Tribe and BLM have stated
determining that the Spirit Cave Man remains were to be classified as unaffiliated.").
113. Id.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1990).
115. See id. § 3006(b) (providing that the Committee is to comprise seven members).
The members are to include three Indian religious leaders appointed by the Secretary of the
Interior, three members selected by the Secretary from a list submitted by museum and
scientific organizations, and one member appointed by the Secretary from a list of persons
developed and consented to by the other six members. Id.
116. Id. § 3006(c)(4).
117. See id. § 3006(d) ("Any records or findings made by the review
committee... relating to the identity or cultural affiliation of any cultural items and the
return of such items may be admissible in any action brought under... this Act.").
118. Fallon Paiute-ShoshoneTribe, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
119. See id. (finding that in February of 2004 the tribe received a letter from the
Director of the BLM stating that no further course of action was being contemplated at that
time).
120. See id. at 1217 ("The Tribe claims both that BLM failed to observe procedures
required by law and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.").
121. Id. at 1216.
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that the remains are Native American" and that an amicus brief cannot
parties. 122
interject issues into a case which have not been presented by the
The BLM's failure to argue that the remains were not Native American
under Bonnichsen was inexplicable in view of the physical similarities
lack of
between the Spirit Cave Man and the Kennewick Man and the total
123
physical similarity between the remains and the modem claimants.
Addressing the adequacy of the BLM's procedure in making its
determination, the Court held that the agency properly consulted with the
tribe and that NAGPRA does not require it to consider and respond to the
Review Committee's findings. 2 4 Yet, this fact did not preclude the Court
from finding that the failure to consider the Committee's findings rendered
the agency's decision arbitrary and capricious.12 5 The Court noted that
under the statutory framework of NAGPRA, tribes must be provided the
opportunity to present evidence to demonstrate cultural affiliation. 26 Thus,
even though the BLM had already determined that the Spirit Cave Man was
culturally unaffiliated, it was under a duty to later reassess its decision in
light of any new evidence the tribe could proffer, including the
Committee's findings.
The Court concluded that while the tribe's evidence appeared to have
been "reviewed to some extent, there is no overarching determination by
27
BLM which explains the reasons for its actions and determinations.',
Finding that the BLM's determination of non-affiliation between the
remains of the Spirit Cave Man and the plaintiff tribe was arbitrary and
capricious, the Court directed the agency to "compare its findings with the
[Tribe's new] evidence and explain why its determination is, or is not, still

122. Id.
123. See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 89 ("[T]he [Spirit Cave Man's] skull had a long,
narrow vault, very atypical of Native Americans ....It was very uncommon for what one
might find in the Great Basin or in any Indian in the past three thousand years.").
124. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-22 (explaining that
the BLM's choice not to defend its position before the Review Committee was not
unreasonable and did not fall to observe NAGPRA's procedures).
125. See id. at 1222 ("[The Review Committee findings are indeed relevant when
determining whether a government agency's determination of non-affiliation is arbitrary or
capricious.").
126. See id. ("[I]nterested tribes may seek to prove affiliation by a preponderance of the
evidence when a finding of non-affiliation is made."); see also 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4)
(2008) (providing Native American tribes an opportunity to show cultural affiliation by a
preponderance of the evidence); 43 C.F.R. § 10.9(b)(4) (requiring the government agency to
request appropriate information from interested parties).
127. Fallon Paiute-ShoshoneTribe, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
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the most correct finding available."'' 28 The Court emphasized that its
decision "does not determine that BLM's initial determination of nonaffiliation is wrong 29and should not be read to mandate a finding of
affiliation by BLM.",
NAGPRA defines cultural affiliation as meaning "that there is a
relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced
historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe ... and an
identifiable earlier group." 130 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Bonnichsen:
[Establishing that remains are Native American] requires only a
general finding that remains have a significant relationship to a
presently existing 'tribe, people or culture,' a relationship that
goes beyond features common to all humanity. [But establishing
cultural affiliation] requires a more specific finding that remains
are most closely affiliated
to specific lineal descendants or to a
131
specific Indian tribe.
Thus, establishing that remains are Native American or culturally
affiliated are similar inquiries insofar as both require proof of a significant
relationship between the remains and a presently-extant Native American
group. As a result, a tribe vying to prove cultural affiliation with remains as
ancient as those of the Spirit Cave Man is likely to encounter many of the
same difficulties that the tribes and agencies in Bonnichsen faced in trying
to prove that Kennewick Man was Native American. For example, the utter
lack of physical similarity between the remains and modem tribe members
which plagued the respondents in Bonnichsen also likely presents a
132
stumbling block for the claimant tribes in the Spirit Cave Man litigation.
Moreover, where there is no physiological continuity between ancient
remains like the Kennewick and Spirit Cave men and modem Native
American claimants, the tremendous antiquity of the remains makes it
unlikely that there will be additional physical evidence that would militate
in favor of a finding of cultural affiliation. In Bonnichsen, evidence of the
claimant tribes' oral traditions and of their aboriginal occupation of the area
in which Kennewick Man was found was held to be insufficient to prove

128. Id. at 1226.
129. Id. at 1225.
130. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2) (1990).
131. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).
132. See Owsley & Jantz, supra note 2, at 149 (asserting that the Spirit Cave Man's
"craniofacial morphology" falls outside the range of variation of all modem groups and so
has a low probability of belonging to any modem group).
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that the remains were Native American. 33 Such evidence should similarly
be inadequate to establish cultural affiliation in the case of the Spirit Cave
Man. Because Spirit Cave Man's remains would almost certainly fail to
qualify as Native American under the Ninth Circuit's analysis in
Bonnichsen, a finding that such remains were culturally affiliated with a
Native American tribe would defy reason.
Studies of the unique physical features of the Kennewick and Spirit
Cave Men indicate that they may have been members of populations that
later became extinct in North America. 134 Because such remains are
unlikely to qualify as Native American or to be found to be culturally
affiliated with a Native American tribe, they appear to fall outside
NAGPRA's regulatory ambit. Yet, the proposed rule mentioned at the
beginning of this Note endeavors to expand the DOI's authority under
NAGPRA so as to include the power to regulate culturally unidentifiable
human remains (CUHR) like the Kennewick and Spirit Cave Men. In so
doing, the rule eviscerates NAGPRA of the limitations it imposes on tribes'
ability to demand repatriation. It thereby erects a de facto bar to the future
study of CUHR by offering up all such remains to tribes for reburial. Thus,
the highly controversial draft rule presents important questions concerning
the scope of the Secretary's authority, if any, to regulate CUHR under
NAGPRA.
IV. Draft Rule Disposing of Culturally UnidentifiableHuman Remains
A. The Secretary'sAuthority to Regulate CUHR under NAGPRA.
"When NAGPRA was under consideration, it was clear to Congress
that culturally unidentifiable remains represented a particularly difficult
problem. Not only was there a lack of agreement among tribes, museums
and the scientific community, there was no agreement among Native

133. Bonnichsens, 367 F.3d at 881 (concluding that the "accounts [of oral history] are
just not specific enough or reliable enough or relevant enough to show a significant
relationship of the Tribal Claimants with Kennewick Man").
134. See Owsley & Jantz, supra note 2, at 147 (explaining that data derived from the
study of ancient remains discloses the complexity of the colonization of the Americas
between 15,000 and 5,000 years ago). The data also suggests that "the populating of the
Americas is likely to have involved higher levels of diversity than were present later, and
consequently, high levels of extinction of some of the earlier groups." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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American groups on how this issue should be resolved." 135 It was
Congress's hope that the experience gained by tribes, museums and
agencies through the process of repatriating culturally identifiable remains
would lead to a resolution for disposing of CUHR that would be agreeable
136
to all sides.
For this reason, CUHR are mentioned but once in
37
1
NAGPRA.
Congress there directs the Committee to "compil[e] an inventory of
culturally unidentifiable human remains that are in the possession or control
of each Federal agency and museum and [to recommend] specific actions
for developing a process for disposition of such remains." 138
This
provision has been the source of much confusion because it does not
specify just who is responsible for "developing a process for disposition of'
CUHR-the Secretary of the Interior or Congress.3
Moreover, if the
Secretary is given authority to regulate CUHR, does such power extend to
all CUHR or just that CUHR that can be shown to be Native American?
The Review Committee, the DOI, and the scientific community have all
advanced different interpretations of the Secretary's rulemaking power
under NAGPRA.
In 2000, the Committee published recommendations urging the
Secretary to draft a rule that would require disposition of Native American
CUHR pursuant to agreements to be reached between tribes, museums and
agencies at regional consultations. 140 The rule actually proposed by DOI on
October 16, 2007, however, purports to regulate all CUHR regardless of
whether the remains are identifiable as Native American.141 Scientific
organizations, for their part, maintain that NAGPRA confers no power upon
135.

William A. Lovis, et al., NAGPRA: Principles, History and Issues, in LEGAL
180 (Jennifer R. Richman & Marion P. Forsyth
eds., Altamira Press 2004).
136. Id.
137. See 25 U.S.C. § 3006(c)(5) (1990) (discussing CUHR only under a recitation of
the Review Committee's responsibilities).
138. Id. § 3006.
139. Id.
140. See Recommendations Regarding the Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable
Native American Human Remains, 65 Fed. Reg. 36,463 (June 8, 2000) ("Within each
region, the appropriate Federal agencies, museums [and] Indian tribes ...[should] consult
together and propose a framework and schedule to develop and implement the most
appropriate model for their region.").
141. See Disposition of CUHR, supra note 9, at 58,588 (claiming that NAGPRA
authorizes the Review Committee to consult with the Secretary of the Interior in the
development of regulations for the disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains).
PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL RESOURCES
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the Secretary to regulate any CUHR, period. 142 The scientists' position is
supported by the fact that neither section 3006(c)(5), nor any other
provision in NAGPRA, expressly
authorizes the Secretary to make rules for
14 3
CUHR.
of
the disposition
Some commentators cite section 3002(b) in asserting that, at a
minimum, DOI has authority to regulate CUHR that can be identified as
Native American.' 44 Nevertheless, extrapolation of a broad grant of
authority to the Secretary to regulate all Native American CUHR is
unwarranted. Section 3002(a) establishes a process for disposing of Native
American cultural items that are found on federal land after NAGPRA's
enactment. 145 Concededly, CUHR that can be identified as Native
American appear to fall within NAGPRA's definition of "Native American
cultural items." 146
It must be kept in mind, however, that section 3002(b) applies only to
items found on federal or tribal land and which go unclaimed under section
3002(a). 147 Section 3005, which governs Native American cultural items
held by museums and agencies, contains no analogous provision
empowering the Secretary to regulate the disposition of such items.
Congress's decision not to empower the Secretary to promulgate rules for
disposing of Native American cultural items held by museums and agencies
142. See Society for American Archaeology, Comments on 2007 Proposed Rule
Relating to CUHR under NAGPRA (Jan. 14, 2008) [hereinafter SAA Comments], available
at http://www.saa.org/NEW/SAACUHRcomments.pdf (contending that "[i]nsofar as CUHR
is concerned, NAGPRA as enacted begins and ends with submission of [the Review
Committee's] recommendations").
143.
See id. (noting that it is an axiom of administrative law that "an agency's 'power
to promulgate... regulations is limited to the authority delegated' to it by Congress"
(quoting Amalgamated Transit Union v. Skinner, 894 F.2d 1362, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
144. See Patty Gerstenblith, CulturalSignificance and the Kennewick Skeleton: Some
Thoughts on the Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes, in CLAIMING THE STONES,
NAMING THE BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIc
IDENTITY 177 (Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., 2002) (asserting that § 3002(b) "provides

that disposition of culturally unidentifiable Native American human remains will be
determined by regulations to be promulgated by" the Review Committee and the Secretary).
145. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(b) (providing that "Native American cultural items not claimed
under subsection (a) shall be disposed of in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
Secretary").
146. Id. § 3001(3) (defining Native American cultural items as including human
remains, associated and unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of cultural
patrimony).
147. Section 3002(a) applies to "cultural items which are excavated or discovered on
Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990...." Id. § 3002(a). Section 3002(b)
applies only to those "cultural items not claimed under subsection (a)." Id. § 3002(b).
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evidences legislative intent that such institutions should keep their
collections where no cultural affiliation is established. Moreover, the
unique grant of regulatory power to the Secretary under section 3002 can be
explained by the necessity of developing a scheme for the curation and
disposition of unclaimed Native American items found after the enactment
of NAGPRA.
In short, there is no basis for inferring that section 3002 was meant to
confer upon the Secretary a general power to regulate CUHR, Native
American or otherwise. At most, that section simply authorizes the
Secretary to promulgate rules for the disposition of Native American
CUHR found on federal land after the enactment of NAGPRA.
B. A BureaucraticThreat to the NAGPRA Equilibrium.
Specifically, the Secretary's rule provides that, for each CUHR in its
possession, a museum or agency must consult all Indian tribes having 48a
"cultural relationship" to the region in which the remains were found.
Where remains' origins are unknown, a museum or agency must consult all
tribes having a "cultural relationship to the region in which the museum or
Federal agency repository is located."'149 Unless a museum or agency can
prove a "right of possession" to the CUHR as defined in NAGPRA, the
remains must be surrendered to the most appropriate Indian tribe according
to the hierarchy of claimants established by the rule. 50 In the event that no
tribe claims CUHR, a museum or agency may obtain the Secretary's
permission to transfer the remains to a non-federally
recognized tribe or re151
inter them "according to State or other law.,
Assuming arguendo that the Secretary does have authority to
promulgate this rule, opponents charge that it is irreconcilably at odds with
148. See Disposition of CUHR, supra note 9, at 58,588-58,589 (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 10.11 (2)(i-iii)(A)) (providing that tribes which must be consulted include groups:
(i) from whose tribal lands the remains were removed; (ii) from whose aboriginal lands the
remains were removed; and (iii) bearing a cultural relationship to the land from which the
remains were removed).
149. Id. at 58,589 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10.1 1(b)(2)(iii)(B)).
150. See id. at 58,585 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10.1 l(c)(1)(i-iii)) (establishing a
hierarchy of claimants). The hierarchy is as follows: (i) tribes from whose land the remains
were removed; (ii) tribes recognized as aboriginally occupying the area in which the remains
were found; and (iii) tribes with (A) a cultural relationship to the region from which the
remains were removed, or (B) where geographic affiliation cannot be determined, tribes with

a cultural relationship to the region in which the museum or agency repository is located. Id.
151.

Id.
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the basic framework established by NAGPRA. 152 By effectively requiring
the surrender of all CUHR for reburial, the proposed rule disregards "the
legitimate public interest in the educational, historical and scientific
information" that the study of such remains may yield. 153 It thereby
"destroy[s the] careful balancing of divergent interests that has been the key
to NAGPRA's success."'154 There are two features of the rule that give it
the practical effect of exposing all CUHR to reburial. First, it applies to all
CUHR rather than merely to remains that can be identified as Native
American; and second, it allows museums and agencies to retain CUHR
only where they can prove a "right of possession" that is impossible to
acquire.155 The regulation is also fundamentally inconsistent with
NAGPRA's basic scheme insofar as it requires remains156to be ceded to tribes
solely on the basis of a sort of "geographic affiliation."'
The most striking feature of the proposed regulation may be what it
does not say-throughout its text, the rule consistently omits of the qualifier
"Native American" from the phrase "culturally unidentifiable human
remains."'157 Despite the fact that many provisions in NAGPRA make clear
that the statute applies only to Native American human remains, the rule
defines "culturally unidentifiable" as "refer[ring] to human remains and
associated funerary objects in museum or Federal agency collections for
which no lineal descendant or culturally affiliated Indian tribe.., has been
identified.' '158 As the Ohio Archaeological Council observed in comments
to DOI, "[t]he rule does not specify that the human remains also must meet
152. See SAA Comments, supra note 142, at 4 ("[Tlhe proposed regulations are
contrary to the administrative structure and policies that Congress enacted into law through
NAGPRA.").
153. Am. Ass'n. of Physical Anthropologists, Position Statement on the Dep't. of the
Interior's Proposed Rule for the Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains 2
(Oct. 26, 2007) [hereinafter AAPA Position Statement], available at http://www.friendsof
past.org/nagpra/071 1AAPAcomment.pdf.
154. Id.
155. See Disposition of CUHR, supra note 9, at 58,585 (changing the regulations so as
to "require[] a museum or Federal agency to offer to transfer control of culturally
unidentifiable human remains for which it cannot prove right of possession to Indian tribes
or Native Hawaiian organizations").
156. Id. at 58,589 (requiring that an agency that cannot prove a right of possession must
return CUHR to tribes based on their geographical affiliation to the land or region where the
remains were found). This geographic hierarchy for the disposition of human remains may
be challenged if a different tribe can show a stronger cultural affiliation despite its lesser
geographic connection to the remains under the regulations hierarchy. Id.
157. See generally Disposition of CUHR, supra note 9.
158. Id. at 58,588.
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of Native American to be considered culturally
the legal definition
159
unidentifiable."

In construing NAGPRA as a grant of authority to regulate the
disposition of CUHR without regard to whether the remains are Native
American, the Secretary runs a flagrant end-around the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Bonnichsen.16° Bonnichsen stands for the very proposition that
"[t]he exhumation, study, and display of ancient human remains that are
unrelated to modem American Indians was not a target of Congress's aim,
nor was it precluded by NAGPRA. 1 61 Under Bonnichsen, inquiry is made
into the culturally affiliated or unaffiliated status of remains only after they
have been determined to be Native American. 162 The draft rule thus
rewrites NAGPRA by disposing of the Native American requirement and,
in the process, exposes all CUHR to tribal requests for repatriation. The
regulation's departure from NAGPRA's mandate has led critics to condemn
the rule as an unprincipled
"effort to force a transfer of all [CUHR] out of
163
institutional curation.

Such cynicism is substantiated by the illusory nature of the provision
purporting to allow museums and agencies to keep CUHR to which they
can show a right of possession. 64 As explained above in Section l1(b),
proving a right of possession to human remains under NAGPRA entails
showing that the remains were acquired with "the full knowledge and
consent of the next of kin or the official governing body of the appropriate
culturally affiliated Indian tribe."'165 The Secretary's regulation is thus
illogical-if remains were acquired with the knowledge and consent of the
deceased's next of kin or of a culturally affiliated tribe, then the cultural

159. Ohio Archaeological Council, OAC Comments on NAGPRA Rule for the
Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains (Jan. 6, 2008) [hereinafter OAC
Comments],
available at http://www.ohioarchaeology.org/joomla/index.php?option
=comcontent&task=view&id=230&Itemid-45.

160. See id. ("[T]he proposed rule's broadening of the intent of NAGPRA appears to be
an attempt to circumvent the Ninth Circuit Court's ruling in the Kennewick Man case .. .
161. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 876 (9th Cir. 2004).
162. See SAA Comments, supra note 142, at 5 ("A finding that remains or items are
Native American is the first step to trigger NAGPRA's applicability.").
163. Id. at 16.
164. AAPA Position Statement, supra note 153, at 3 ("The definition of right of
possession in the proposed regulations makes it logically impossible for museums to have a
legal right of possession to any of their [CUHR].").
165. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13).
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affiliation of the remains would be known and they would never have been
classified as CUHR.' 66
Lastly, the rule is antithetical to NAGPRA's basic scheme insofar as it
allows a Native American tribe's geographic affiliation with a region to
serve as a proxy for cultural affiliation with the remains. 167 The express
purpose of Congress in requiring tribes to demonstrate cultural affiliation
with remains in order to obtain repatriation was "to ensure that the claimant
has a reasonable connection with the materials." 168 Clearly, evidence as to
the aboriginal occupation of the land on which remains were discovered is a
relevant factor in determining their cultural affiliation. 169 But, as both
NAGPRA's drafters and the Court in Bonnichsen recognized, "geographic
170
proximity is not tantamount to cultural or biological affiliation."'
Moreover, the geographic location of an institution may "have absolutely
nothing to do with cultural affiliation of the remains [it] curate[s]."' 17' Thus,
the provision allowing tribes to claim CUHR of unknown origins solely on
the ground that they inhabit the same geographic region in which the
curating institution is located is particularly absurd.
For myriad reasons, it is apparent that the Secretary's proposed
regulation flouts the limits which NAGPRA imposed on repatriation. At
the same time, the regulation does nothing to further NAGPRA's bedrock
principle that Native American cultural items should be returned to modern
172
tribes sharing some demonstrable cultural or genetic nexus with them.
What is more, by proposing the rule, the Secretary has usurped authority
that NAGPRA plainly does not confer. This error is exacerbated by the
166. SAA Comments, supra note 142, at 16 (asserting that CUHR "are by definition
culturally unidentifiable, which means that it is impossible to have obtained 'voluntary
consent of an individual or group that had authority of alienation"' (internal citations
omitted)).
167. See Comment Letter from Ryan M. Seidemann, Esq., to Sherry Hutt, Manager of
the Nat'l. NAGPRA Program, Nat'l. Park Serv. (Nov. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Seidemann's
Comment Letter], available at http://www.friendsofpast.org/nagpra/0711Seidemannletter.
pdf ("Congress did not intend for NAGPRA to simply give any remains to any existing
group with no consideration for cultural affiliation.").
168. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at 141 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 14
(1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4373).
169. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (providing that a tribe may show cultural affiliation on
the basis of a variety of factors, including geography).
170. Seidemann's Comment Letter, supra note 167, at 5.
171. SAA Comments, supra note 142, at 12.
172. See OAC Comments, supra note 159 (explaining that the final disposition of
human remains to culturally unaffiliated tribes is a result expressly not intended by
Congress).
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rule's failure to limit its application to CUHR that are clearly identifiable as
Native American, a transparent attempt to circumvent Bonnichsen. By
requiring museums and agencies to show a right of possession to CUHR
that can never be acquired, the Secretary's rule effectively grants Native
American tribes unilateral authority to control the disposition of even the
most ancient North American human remains.
V. Summary and Conclusion
As human rights legislation, NAGPRA was designed to counteract the
effects of the ethnocentric American common law tradition, which for
centuries afforded Native American burials virtually no protection. 173 At
common law, a claimant seeking to exercise quasi-property rights in a dead
body had to prove a blood relationship with the deceased. 174 Many Indian
tribes buried their dead in unmarked graves or were forced to relocate away
from traditional burial grounds, and so few could meet this demanding
standard. 75 Common law cemetery protections were similarly construed by
courts so as to provide little protection to unmarked Indian graves. 176 The
failure of the common law in these respects, along with racist 19th century
governmental policies promoting the looting of Indian graves, brought a
Native American human remains into museum and Government
great many
77
curation. 1

NAGPRA remedies the injustices wrought under the common law by
empowering modem tribes to regain possession of wrongfully-acquired
cultural items and to prevent similar misappropriations in the future. 178 The
scientific community generally supported the passage of NAGPRA,
believing that the statute's standard of cultural affiliation would ensure a

173. See generally Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of
Understanding,Preserving,and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and the Native
Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 175
(1992).
174. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 12, 18 and accompanying text.
177. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 4, at 125 ("National estimates are that
between one hundred thousand and two million deceased Native people have been dug up
from their graves for storage or display by government agencies, museums, universities, and
tourist attractions.").
178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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fair balance between its own interests and those of modem tribes. 17 9
Indeed, as a general rule, the standard of cultural affiliation is well-suited to
guide the disposition the Native American human remains subject to
NAGPRA because most such remains postdate the arrival of Europeans.
The relative recentness of the remains makes it likely that there are
culturally affiliated descendants which might be identified. Moreover,
modem remains are typically of less scientific interest than more ancient
remains. Thus, NAGPRA, as enacted, capitalizes on the naturallyoccurring middle ground between the positions of scientists and Native
180
Americans.
The discovery of very ancient CUHR in recent years, however, gave
rise to closer judicial examination of NAGPRA. In Bonnichsen, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend that NAGPRA should
govern the disposition of remains having no cultural relationship to a
presently-extant tribe.' 8' Specifically, the Court found that the evidence of
a relationship between Kennewick Man and the Umatilla was so attenuated
as to not support a finding that the remains are Native American-let alone
culturally affiliated with the claimant tribe.182 The Secretary's rule,
however, replaces NAGPRA's cultural affiliation criterion with one of
"geographic affiliation."' 183 This standard effectively removes all limitations
on tribes' ability to demand possession of culturally unidentifiable
remains.184
Such results are irreconcilable with the balancing principle at the heart
of NAGPRA and which informed the Court's decision in Bonnichsen-as
the antiquity of the human remains at issue becomes greater and their
cultural affiliation less certain, the public interest in the study of such
remains increases while the moral justification for reburial decreases. The
proposed rule should therefore be withdrawn. The Secretary's persistence
in promulgating the draft rule will only "foment divisiveness" and, as in
Bonnichsen, beget many years of litigation between the Government and

179. See, e.g., AAPA Position Statement, supra note 153, at 1 (describing the APAA's
initial support for NAGPRA).
180. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
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the scientific community. 85 Withdrawal is particularly appropriate in view
18 6
of the Secretary's dubious authority to regulate CUHR under NAGPRA.
If Congress desires that the Secretary draft rules disposing of CUHR,
then such intent should be expressed unequivocally. Congress should
further sketch out a skeletal framework to guide the agency in developing a
process for disposing of CUHR, as it did in NAGPRA. Such legislation,
however, does not appear to be on the horizon. Since the Bonnichsen
litigation erupted more than a decade ago, Congress has declined to adopt a
variety of amendments that would have rendered NAGPRA more favorable
to one side or the other. 87 This fact evidences Congress's continuing
commitment to NAGPRA's balancing principle and, in combination with
Bonnichsen, indicates that a course of compromise will be followed into the
foreseeable future.

185. SAA Comments, supra note 142, at 21.
186. See supra notes 154-163 and accompanying text.
187. See e.g., S. 2843, 105th Cong. § 14 (2004) (proposing to add the words "or was"
after the word "is" in 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9), effectively expanding NAGPRA's definition to
potentially include ancient CUHR); H.R. 2893, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing to amend
NAGPRA by adding provisions specifically authorizing the study of CUHR found on federal
lands).

